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Abstract—Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)-based civilian or
military applications become more critical to serving civilian
and/or military missions. The significantly increased attention on
UAV applications also has led to security concerns particularly in
the context of networked UAVs. Networked UAVs are vulnerable
to malicious attacks over open-air radio space and accordingly
intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have been naturally derived
to deal with the vulnerabilities and/or attacks. In this paper, we
briefly survey the state-of-the-art IDS mechanisms that deal with
vulnerabilities and attacks under networked UAV environments.
In particular, we classify the existing IDS mechanisms according
to information gathering sources, deployment strategies, detection
methods, detection states, IDS acknowledgment, and intrusion
types. We conclude this paper with research challenges, insights,
and future research directions to propose a networked UAV-
IDS system which meets required standards of effectiveness and
efficiency in terms of the goals of both security and performance.
Index Terms—Unmanned aerial vehicle, intrusion detection
system, security, attack, vulnerability.
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and
their diverse applications in many different domains have
been realized due to their merit of dynamic reconfigurability,
fast response, and ease of deployment. In particular, the
applications of networked UAVs have attracted major industry
players such as Google, Facebook, Boeing, and Amazon. In
addition, their applications in serving military and civilian
missions have been explored in diverse domains to provide
public safety, surveillance, medical services, and/or military
mission support [13]. In Table I, we discuss the key application
domains where UAVs can be applied to assist given missions
in different domain context.
The key merit of UAVs is known as its high reconfigurability
and mobility. However, its mobility also exposes an issue
of controllability towards the aerial vehicles and causes link
distortion in UAV networking. Despite these concerns, UAV-
assisted networks have been recognized for the benefit of easy
deployment of wireless connectivity that does not require any
physical infrastructure [19, 20].
UAVs provide high benefits to assist the goals of many
different applications, as summarized in Table I. However,
they also introduce the following challenges [21]: (1) the
architectural design of drone communication lacks a standard
or unification; (2) UAV-assisted communication networks suf-
fer from an issue of dedicated spectrum sharing; (3) UAV
deployment and path planning should be considered during
spectrum allocations due to its potential impact on energy
efficiency; and (4) UAV communications introduce additional
overhead to architectural design, deployment, and consistency
with large and reliable networks along with their security. In
this work, we particularly focus on security challenges.
This paper provides the following key contributions:
• We survey the key state-of-the-art UAV-IDS approaches
and associated taxonomies which can provide a good
overview to answer what a UAV-IDS system is, what the
key components need to be considered in the UAV-IDS,
and what the key security concerns should be considered,
associated with the key components of the UAV-IDS.
• We discuss the main research challenges and hurdles
to build a cyber-physical hardened UAV-IDS system
under highly resource-constrained, hostile, dynamic, and
distributed environments reflecting the key characteristics
of military tactical characteristics.
• We suggest future research directions to move towards
based on the discussed research challenges and learned
lessons / insights.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II provides the background and goal of UAV-IDS. Section III
discusses the taxonomies used in the structure and classifica-
tion of UAV-IDS. Section IV discusses the evaluation tech-
niques of the state-of-the-art UAV-IDS approaches. Section V
discusses research challenges derived from the inherent char-
acteristics of UAV-IDS environments. Section VI concludes
the paper and suggests future work directions.
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TABLE I
DOMAINS AND APPLICATIONS OF UAVS
Domain Key example applications Achieved roles by UAVs
Law enforcement surveillance Search and rescue Equipped with camera
Public safety communications Voice communications in case of disaster Aerial base stations
Environmental applications Climate change Equipped with sensors
Logistics Goods shipping / delivery in urban areas Drone as a transportation medium
Military applications Searches for lost or injured soldiers Armed with live video remote communications to ground
troops, essential gear, or weapons
Medical field applications Delivering aid packages, medicines, vaccines, blood
and other medical supplies to remote areas
Drone as a transportation medium
Video and photography Events (e.g., social gatherings, sports games, or
competitions)
Equipped with camera
Agriculture Crop monitoring and soil and field analysis Equipped with sensors
II. OVERALL DESCRIPTION OF UAV-IDS ENVIRONMENTS
An unmanned aerial vehicle based intrusion detection sys-
tem (UAV-IDS) is developed to detect anomaly behaviour
or illegal activities in a network by automatically analyzing
the behaviors or activities based on given hypothesis and/or
policies, which are governed by the security rules of the given
network [2]. The UAV-IDS monitors system configuration,
data files, and/or network transmission to check whether there
exists an attack. Hence, the UAV-IDS is to mitigate the effect
of the attacks aiming to prevent any covert / overt operations
from exposed vulnerabilities of the system. In addition, UAV-
IDSs aim to detect the misuse of UAVs. Misuse can be defined
as any undesirable activity which can cause any harmful effect
in terms of either performance or security to an entire swarm of
the UAVs. Attacks explore the vulnerabilities of UAV systems,
where the vulnerabilities can be the result of misconfigurations
of UAV networks, an implementation fault, flawed designs
and/or protocols [4].
Fig. 1 shows an example scenario for an UAV-IDS. UAV-
IDSs monitor signals, command traffic, control instructions,
working behavior, energy consumption, and/or operations of
UAV components. In addition, it analyzes the data flow
and gather information from different components of UAVs
during their operations as a network node. The UAV-IDSs
are capable of enhancing reliability and/or security of UAV
communications in an efficient and effective manner.
A UAV-IDS can be placed on a UAV or a ground control
system and maintains the security and reliability of the UAV
and the ground control system. The placement of a UAV-IDS
can be determined based on the level of required security,
such as required security levels in terms of confidentiality,
integrity, availability, and authorization. In addition, a UAV-
IDS is responsible for ensuring guarding the UAV system
against unlawful activities or attacks. The incorporated secu-
rity policies for UAVs provide low-complex rules to detect
anomalies or potential threats. These policies can be designed
through different approaches or algorithms based on the re-
quirements of the UAV system. Most existing IDSs for UAVs
use behaviour-based detection mechanisms [23].
III. TAXONOMIES OF UAV-IDS SYSTEM COMPONENTS
We summarize the key component taxonomies of the UAV-
IDS system in Fig. 2 which discusses its key components,
Fig. 1. An operational overview of UAV-IDS.
including information gathering sources, deployment strate-
gies, detection methods, detection states, acknowledgment, and
intrusion types. We give the detail of each component as below.
A. Information Gathering Sources
A UAV is embedded with a cyber-physical system con-
sisting of sensors and/or actuators. Sensors provide data (or
information) to an actuator that can control the UAV. The
collected data are used for analysis to make mission-related
critical decisions. The information gathering sources can be
classified as follows: [10]
• Sensors: Sensors collect information in terms of signals
and/or behavior through sensors like inertial sensors,
location sensors, and/or threat sensors. The sensor may
be implicitly tied with a UAV or explicitly tied to a
specific task object, like weather capturing sensors. The
information retrieval by a malicious node from any of
onboard sensors in a critical situation can impact the
performance of a UAV in a networked scenario.
• Communications links: Communication links support
transmissions directly to UAVs in mission areas and/or
allow simultaneous sharing of information among multi-
ple UAVs and the ground system. They also secure data
transfers by monitoring the traffic between a source and
a destination.
• Ground control system (GCS): The GCS has a signif-
icant component in UAVs and is charged of conducting
intelligent surveillance and reconnaissance based on data
generated by the unmanned aircraft’s payload.
• UAV components: The components within a UAV in-
clude a power supply unit, antennas, transceiver units,
navigation systems, and an inbuilt UAV control system.
All inter- and intra-communications take place through
these components, in which the information is exchanged
among these components for an effective control and
maneuvering of UAVs. This information should be ex-
amined for security purposes and timely patches should
be available upon the detection of potential threats.
• Deployment strategies: The deployment of an IDS in
UAVs is critical because effective optimization is required
for balancing the trade-off between IDS operations and
UAV transmissions. The system should be maintained
to enhance performance of the UAV with their effective
operations and environmental conditions along with con-
trollable activities of the deployed IDS. The IDS can be
deployed based on two methods:
1) Ground-coordinated or network-initiated basis:
In the ground coordinated IDS, all the gathered
information is analyzed on the ground station and
appropriate decisions are made on the basis of
analyzed data; and
2) Autonomous or host basis: With an autonomous
deployment of IDSs, UAVs acting as hosts to deploy
IDSs should conduct data analysis and control other
UAVs, along with coordinating between these two.
In this deployment type, the IDS is placed within
the system control of UAVs in the form of hardware
or software.
B. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs)
The key mechanism of IDSs can be classified as follows:
• Specification-based [26]: A UAV-IDS is incorporated
with respective rules specified based on the expected
behaviors of UAVs. These specified rules are applied to
monitor successful executions of the UAV system.
• Signature-based [27]: This method aims to detect known
attacks based on pre-defined, known signatures. Upon
detecting anomaly activities, a detection operation is
triggered to identify a matched signature to ensure the
detection of an intrusion.
• Anomaly-based [14]: Anomaly behavior is detected
based on a failure or an illegal activity observed in a sys-
tem. With the goal of detecting known and/or unknown
attacks, this method uses learning or a filtering mecha-
nism, which can significantly enhance the detection of
unknown attacks in the absence of pre-defined signatures
of the unknown attacks.
• Hybrid-based [1]: This method is a hybrid approach
by integrating two or more detection methods, such as
specification plus anomaly, in order to provide a strong
detection policy that can catch known and/or unknown
attacks.
Fig. 2. Taxonomy of UAV-IDSs.
C. Detection States
Based on the source of information, we can categorize two
major detection states:
• On-site (or dynamic): The detection state is evaluated
based on data collected and monitored from real-time
operations; the detection analysis and decisions are made
at on-site UAVs.
• Off-site (or static): The detection state is evaluated based
on data collected by an IDS from all information sources;
the detection is made based on the analysis of all collected
data received in the IDS.
D. IDS Acknowledgment
Based on the result of data analysis, a UAV-IDS makes
decision on whether there exists an attack via an IDS acknowl-
edgment. This IDS acknowledgment has two forms:
TABLE II
SURVEY ON THE STATE-OF-THE-ART ON EXISTING UAV IDS APPROACHES.
Reference Proposed scheme Key method(s) / metrics
Blasch et al. [3] War planning situation awareness tool ROC for visualization
Lauf et al. [10] Hybrid IDS Maxima and cross-correlation detection
Shen et al. [23] Markov game theoretic approach Deployment of IDS, configuration of email-filtering, firewall
settings, and shutdown or reset policies for servers.
Muniraj and Farhood [12] Framework for detection of cyber-physical attacks on
the sensors
Anomaly-based detectors based on knowledge of the physical
system and statistical analysis.
Sedjelmaci et al. [17] Hierarchical IDS Threat classification & behavior monitoring
Mitchell and Chen [11] Behavior rule-based evaluations Minimizing false positives & false negatives
Kwon et al. [8] Safety analysis under stealthy cyber attacks Real-time safety assessment
Lauf and Robinson [9] Distributed resource system Intrusion-tolerance strategy
Shen et al. [24] Game theoretic approach Based on the three levels: object, situation and threat.
Sedjelmaci et al. [15] Security game framework Optimal setting identification based on intrusion detection rate
with minimum overhead using Bayesian game
Trafton and Pizzi [25] Network service suite Framework for information assurance of UAVs
• Instant acknowledgement: In this acknowledgment, an
IDS monitoring is performed at real-time and decisions
or alarms are generated in the form of instant acknowl-
edgments.
• Periodic acknowledgement: In this acknowledgement,
an IDS continuously gathers the data but the decisions
are based on the periodical analysis of received data.
E. Intrusion Types
A UAV-IDS should be able to detect the following intrusion
types:
• Virus, worms, and/or malware;
• Modification of signals, modification of sharing informa-
tion;
• Routing attacks, UAV capturing, and/or path alteration;
and
• Message forgery, UAV spoofing, and/or GPS spoofing.
IV. SURVEY OF EXISTING UAV-IDS APPROACHES
UAV networks are highly sensitive over which critical
information will be exchanged between UAVs and the ground
station. Table 2 summarizes the state-of-the-art UAV-IDS
approaches, aiming to enhance security and performance with
the end goal to build a cyber-physical hardened system being
protected against inside and outside attackers on networked
UAVs. Below we survey these existing approaches using our
proposed taxonomies discussed in Section III.
Blasch et al. [3] proposed a war planning situation aware-
ness tool by leveraging the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) plots to visualize the effectiveness of their classifi-
cations. The effective classification is developed based on
matrices where situation assessment is used to derive relations
between a given classification and a location. Lauf et al. [10]
developed a decentralized anomaly-based detection technique,
which uses maxima and cross-correlation detection methods.
The Maxima Detection System (MDS) allows the characteri-
zation of either one or zero suspicious nodes. Cross-correlation
detection methods are capable of detecting multiple intrusions.
However, this work does not capture the quality of the IDS
based on detection errors including false positives and false
negatives.
Shen et al. [23] took a game theoretic approach by con-
sidering three levels of states: object, situation, and threat.
This approach projects attack activities while focusing on the
states of the network. Shen et al. [24] further developed a
cooperative surveillance strategy to improve the performance
through adaptive Markov game based on the cooperative
jamming strategies. These are performed on the basis of four
defensive parameters, including IDS deployment, configura-
tions of email-filtering, firewall settings, and shut down or
reset policies for servers.
Muniraj and Farhood [12] focused on the attacks over small
UAVs by identifying malicious activities over their sensors. In
the proposed framework that detects cyber-physical attacks,
sensors are designed based on the knowledge of physical
system and statistical analysis techniques. However, the pro-
posed scheme was not capable of detecting combination of
piece-wise constant attacks of smaller magnitude. Sedjelmaci
et al. [17] proposed an hierarchical IDS and intrusion response
mechanism by classifying threats and monitoring UAV behav-
ior to detect malicious activities.
Mitchell and Chen [11] proposed a specification-based de-
tection technique to guard a UAV system against cyber-attacks.
This work used a behavior rule-based UAV-IDS, in which the
behavior rules are constructed based on defined attack models,
considering reckless, random, and opportunistic attacks. This
work minimized detection errors (i.e., false positives and false
negatives) based on the critical tradeoff between security and
performance of UAVs. Kwon et al. [8] developed a real-time
safety assessment algorithm based on reachability analysis to
deal with cyber attacks.
Lauf and Robinson [9] developed a distributed sensing
mechanism to build a fault-tolerant resource management
system. The proposed mechanisms uses a service discovery
protocol (SDP) where SDP flooding can introduce a burst of
communications leading to traffic congestion or bottleneck
issues. Sedjelmaci et al. [16] proposed a threat estimation
model based on estimated beliefs towards whether a threat
exists in the system. In addition, this work incorporated spe-
cific detection policies to maintain data integrity and network
availability. Sedjelmaci et al. [15] took one step further to
propose a robust UAV assisted network against lethal attack-
ers, namely a Security Game Framework (SGF), which is
formulated based on Bayesian game among the suspected
nodes. This approach formulates two attack-defense problems
between IDS and the attacker, and between intrusion ejection
system and the suspected nodes.
Trafton and Pizzi [25] proposed the so called Joint Airborne
Network Services Suite, which aims to integrate an airborne
military network by allowing the implementation of various
possible hardware and software solutions. In this work, an IDS
is considered as an integral part of their assurance strategy.
V. RESEARCH CHALLENGES
UAVs are operated remotely while receiving control and
command messages from ground stations. These command
and control messages are transmitted over different channels
and variable transmission rate. Security vulnerabilities can be
exploited to compromise confidentiality, integrity, availability,
and authorization of networked UAVs [6, 7]. Message security
and control signal protections are achieved by cryptographic
mechanisms. However, security issues, like unauthorized ac-
cess, malicious control, illegal connection, or other malicious
attacks, require strategic solutions without compromising per-
formance. Identifying and mitigating threats in UAV networks
efficiently and effectively is a first step to secure UAV net-
works [18, 22].
The significant increase of threats and/or attacks in UAV
networks brought our attention on the issue of the deployment
of IDS which will play a key role to achieve the effectiveness
and efficiency of the UAV-IDS [5]. In a UAV environment, an
IDS is being operated based on specific rules and/or policies
to determine whether an observed activity is malicious or not.
The results of the IDSs can be used to develop strategies to
mitigate the identified risks. However, the design and develop-
ment meeting these two requirements (i.e., effectiveness and
efficiency of the developed IDS) is not a trivial goal because it
often requires a time-consuming, high-overhead process which
can often exceed the benefit of introducing high security in
practice.
To achieve the UAV-IDS system that meets required lev-
els of effectiveness (i.e., minimizing detection errors with
minimum service interruptions) and efficiency (i.e., reducing
computational and communication overhead), we identify the
following challenges on the table to pave a way to build a
cyber-physical hardened UAV-IDS system:
• Detection latency: The detection latency can be used as a
measure of agility of an IDS. However, there is a critical
tradeoff in that triggering the IDS more often leads
to incurring more communication/computation overhead,
which naturally results in low efficiency, and vice-versa.
Hence, we need to make a good balance to achieve
both efficiency and effectiveness in order to build an
affordable, secure UAV-IDS systems in practice.
• IDS computational cost: The computational cost as-
sociated with IDSs is closely related to how much we
want to achieve the accuracy of the IDS and security
vulnerabilities we allow in a given system. Again, this
issue is not trivial because more cost not only incurs high
overhead, but brings more benefit in enhancing security.
• Implementation overhead: The high implementation
overhead of IDSs causes power consumption and de-
grades the performance of UAVs resulting in a network
shutdown.
• Threat & behavior modeling: IDS detection techniques
incorporate behaviors of UAVs. The rules are designed
by reflecting the UAVs’ behavior and/or possible threats.
However, accurate observations of threat/attack behaviors
and accordingly their correct modeling is not a trivial task
although achieving it can provide an enormous benefit to
expedite the development of better defense strategies.
• Effective threat assessment: An effective threat assess-
ment is critical to mitigating vulnerabilities and risks
associated with threats occurred. In particular, developing
effective threat assessment policies is the key to enhance
both security and performance of UAV-IDS systems.
• Maximum network throughput with minimum cost:
This is a typical tradeoff issue any network can face as
these two goals are conflicting to each other. However,
based on dynamic monitoring to capture an accurate
system state, both goals that are dynamically set can be
achievable.
• Lightweight IDS with minimum resource consump-
tion: As UAVs are battery-operated and resource-
constrained, the development of lightweight IDS mech-
anisms is highly challenging but a must to achieve in
networked UAVs.
• Effective monitoring and attack response: The re-
sponse against an attack is naturally related to how
quickly the attack is detected by a given IDS. This
implies that the effectiveness of the IDS is closely
related to how quickly the system can respond to the
detected attack. This is indeed the issue of the agility
of a system which should take appropriate actions in
order to minimize damages or vulnerabilities caused by
the intrusion which exploits system vulnerabilities. The
contested nature of UAV environments, characterized by
resource-constraints, high hostility, high dynamics, and
distributed nature, also adds more challenges to achieve
this goal.
VI. CONCLUSION & FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In this work, we provided a brief overview of the state-
of-the-art UAV-IDS mechanisms. In addition, we discussed
related design challenging issues to develop effective and
efficient UAV-IDS mechanisms, considering high resource-
constraints, high hostility characterized by sophisticated at-
tack/threat behaviors, and distributed nature causing high secu-
rity vulnerabilities. We also defined the taxonomies to describe
the key components of UAV-IDS systems based on the state-
of-the-art existing works. Lastly, we discussed key research
challenges that should be considered for future research plans,
aiming to build an affordable, secure cyber-physical UAV-IDS
system.
As future work directions, we plan to conduct the following:
• Define an attack model that captures key attack
behaviors targeting for UAV-IDS systems. We will
derive an attack graph and build a set of corresponding
countermeasures to deal with those attacks.
• Develop a behavior rule specification-based UAV-IDS
that uses minimum memory while maximizing detection
accuracy by checking the anomaly of an observed behav-
ior. Formal verification and Bayesian estimation based
ground truth check for anomaly behaviors can be used to
validate the developed set of specification rules.
• Measure the effectiveness and efficiency of the devel-
oped lightweight UAV-IDS using the metrics of agility
or resilience.
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